American Express · Business Model

Amex's Famous "Closed Loop" Has Been Quietly Open for Years. The Moat Was Never the Loop.

Everyone calls American Express a closed-loop network that owns every merchant and cardholder. Its own filings say otherwise: third parties run the long tail. The closed loop holds for the high-spend core - direct merchants are the minority of locations but command the lion's share of the dollars - and the real asset is the data those transactions leave behind.

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Swipe an American Express card at a hotel and the textbook story goes like this: Amex issued your card, Amex signed up the hotel, Amex carried the risk, and Amex sees the whole transaction end to end. One company, both ends of the wire, nobody in between. It's the cleanest "closed loop" in payments, and Amex says so itself - it is "the issuer, network, and a merchant acquirer" all "under one roof," with "direct relationships with both Card Members and merchants."4 It's a beautiful description. It's also no longer how most of the merchants got there.

The official story is that Amex is a pure closed loop that owns every relationship at both ends. The truer story is in Amex's own filings: it has spent years quietly opening the loop - handing the small-merchant and international ends to third parties on purpose - because the asset it was protecting was never the loop itself.

Our global closed-loop network connects millions of buyers and sellers directly, providing a holistic view of every transaction... being both a network and an issuer gives us a unique, end-to-end perspective.7
American ExpressFrom its newsroom, on what sets it apart

The loop Amex describes is real - for the customers who matter most

Start with where the closed loop genuinely holds. For large U.S. merchants on direct agreements, Amex really does sit at both ends: it issued the card, it signed the merchant, it processes the transaction, it sees everything. That slice is small in count and enormous in money - large direct merchants are a fraction of accepting locations by number, but they command the lion's share of the dollars that flow across the network. The loop isn't a myth. It's just been carefully narrowed to the part of the business where owning both ends is worth the cost of owning both ends.

Now look at the long tail, and the picture inverts. To get accepted at the corner cafe and the mid-sized boutique - the merchants who long refused Amex over its fees - the company built OptBlue, a program that lets third-party processors set pricing, onboard the merchant, and run settlement.5 At that cafe, the merchant's counterparty isn't Amex. It's the processor. Internationally it goes further still: Amex's own 10-K discloses that its Global Network Services partners "serve as the merchant acquirer and processor for local merchants," "own the customer relationships," and "bear the credit and fraud risk" on the Amex-branded cards they issue.3 That is not a closed loop. That is a franchised one.

Large U.S. merchant (direct)OptBlue small merchantInternational GNS partner
Who acquires the merchantAmexThird-party processorPartner bank
Who owns the relationshipAmexThe processorThe partner
Who bears credit/fraud riskAmexShared / processorThe partner
What Amex keepsEverythingThe data and the brandThe data and the brand
Where the loop is closed, and where Amex let it open

Read that last row again, because it's the whole argument. Across every model - direct, OptBlue, GNS - one thing never gets delegated: Amex still sees the spend. It surrenders the acquiring relationship, the onboarding, even the risk, but it keeps the transaction record and the cardmember. The moat was never end-to-end control. It was the data and the customer that control happened to produce.

Why "merchant fees are the cash cow" is a decade out of date

The other myth says Amex is essentially a merchant-fee machine, living on a discount rate it charges shops. There was a time that was closer to true. It isn't anymore. In FY2024 Amex reported $65.9 billion in total revenues net of interest expense and $10.1 billion in net income.1 The revenue is split three ways, not concentrated in one: $50.4 billion of non-interest revenue, $21.1 billion of interest on loans, and net card fees of $8.4 billion - the fees cardmembers pay just to hold the card, up 16% in a single year.2 Merchant discount fees are still the largest single line at $35.2 billion for FY2024, but the old shorthand of calling them the dominant majority of revenue quietly drops the $21.1 billion interest income line and the swelling $8.4 billion card-fee line out of the denominator.10

$8.4B
Amex's FY2024 net card fee revenue - the price of admission, up 16% in a year. People are paying more just to carry the card2

That card-fee line is the tell. Unlike open-network card brands that earn no annual fee from cardholders at the network level, Amex earns billions in card fees, because Amex sells membership in the network as a product in itself. The fee buys you into a tier, and the tier buys Amex a high-spending, low-default cardmember whose transactions feed back into the loop. The flywheel runs on spend, not swipes: $1.55 trillion of cardmember spending in 2024, up 6%, and a record 13 million new cards acquired.28 More premium members, more spend, more data, better rewards, more premium members. The discount fee is just one place the wheel touches the ground.

The spend-centric flywheel
Revenue ≈ (cardmember spend × discount fee) + interest on loans + card fees − rewards & incentives

On $1.55 trillion of cardmember spend, Amex monetizes the same transaction three ways at once: a discount fee from the merchant, interest from any balance the member carries, and an annual card fee for the privilege of being in the network at all.2 No single lever has to dominate, because they all ride the same growing stream of premium spend - which is exactly why losing the acquiring relationship on a small merchant costs Amex far less than losing the spend would.

Doesn't opening the loop just turn Amex into a worse Visa?

The fair objection is sharp: if Amex franchises out the acquiring and the risk to processors and partner banks, hasn't it abandoned the one thing that made it special and become a higher-fee version of an open network? If the corner cafe deals with a processor, not Amex, the loop is just marketing. There's real force to that. The directional knock that Amex costs merchants more is documented - its discount fee runs as high as 3.30% per transaction, with a reported floor near 1.43%, and it doesn't publish a single unified rate schedule the way the open networks do.6 A merchant could be forgiven for not noticing any difference between "Amex" and "a network."

But the objection mistakes the plumbing for the product. What Amex gave away was operational - who runs settlement, who signs the merchant, who eats a fraud loss. What it kept was structural: it still issues the card, still owns the cardmember, and still records the spend, even when a partner runs the merchant end.3 An open network sees a transaction and a code. Amex sees who bought what, where, at what tier, on which trip - and it can act on that, because it also controls the card and the rewards. Opening the loop was the move that let Amex keep its data advantage while shedding the cost of universal acceptance. It out-located its own purity to protect the thing underneath it.

Ask what the structure was protecting, not what the structure is

A famous business model is usually described by its most visible feature - Amex's "closed loop," the integration you can point to. But the visible feature is rarely the moat; it's the thing that produces the moat. Amex's loop produced proprietary spend data and a captive premium cardmember, and once it could keep those without owning every merchant relationship, it franchised the relationship away to scale acceptance. The strategic read: when a company starts quietly violating its own famous principle - opening a closed loop, licensing a secret recipe, white-labeling its crown jewel - don't assume it's drifting. Ask what it kept. That's where the real asset was hiding the whole time. Investors who still price Amex as a pure closed loop are valuing the plumbing and missing the data.

American Express looks like a company defined by owning both ends of the wire, and for its richest merchants and cardmembers, it still does. But it has spent decades handing the rest of the wire to partners and processors - GNS officially launched in 19979 and OptBlue followed in 201411 - not because the loop didn't matter, but because the loop was never the point. The point was the cardmember it could keep and the spend it could see. Amex didn't dilute its closed loop. It figured out which thread of it was load-bearing, kept that one in an iron grip, and let go of everything else. The genius wasn't owning the whole loop. It was knowing which part of the loop it could afford to give away.

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Sources

Where this comes from — the filings, records, and reporting behind it.

  1. 1
    Primary · Company recordDocumented
    American Express FY2024: record revenues of $65.9 billion (up 9%, or 10% FX-adjusted), record net income of $10.1 billion ($14.01 EPS, up 25% YoY), and record 13 million new card acquisitions.
  2. 2
    Primary · SEC filingDocumented
    FY2024 10-K: Total non-interest revenues $50.406 billion; interest on loans $21.095 billion; total revenues net of interest expense $65.949 billion; net card fee revenue $8.4 billion (+16% YoY); cardmember spending $1.55 trillion (+6% YoY).
  3. 3
    Primary · SEC filingDocumented
    Amex's Global Network Services (GNS) IO (international/partner issuer) partners 'serve as the merchant acquirer and processor for local merchants,' 'own the customer relationships,' and 'bear the credit and fraud risk' for Amex-branded cards they issue - a direct primary-source qualification of the 'pure closed-loop' claim.
  4. 4
    Primary · Company recordDocumented
    American Express itself describes the closed-loop model as: 'American Express is the issuer, network, and a merchant acquirer... offers Card products, acquires merchants, and processes the transactions under one roof,' giving 'direct relationships with both Card Members and merchants.'
  5. 5
    SecondaryWidely reported
    OptBlue - introduced to increase acceptance among small and mid-sized businesses - allows third-party processors to manage pricing, onboarding, and settlement for Amex transactions, explicitly delegating the acquirer-merchant relationship to non-Amex parties and partially opening the closed loop for the long tail of merchants.
  6. 6
    SecondaryWidely reported
    Amex's merchant discount fee (its term for what Visa/Mastercard call 'interchange') ranges from approximately 1.43% + $0.10 to 3.30% + $0.10 per transaction per the Amex Merchant Reference Guide - the floor is materially below the 2.5%-3.5% range widely cited in secondary commentary.
  7. 7
    Primary · Company recordDocumented
    American Express's own newsroom states its 'global closed-loop network connects millions of buyers and sellers directly, providing a holistic view of every transaction' and that 'being both a network and an issuer gives us a unique, end-to-end perspective' for fraud reduction and data insights.
  8. 8
    SecondaryWidely reported
    Payments Dive reported FY2024: net card fee revenue $8.4 billion (+16%), cardmember spending $1.55 trillion (+6%), and 13 million new card acquisitions (+6.6% YoY), corroborating the Amex IR release with independent editorial coverage.
  9. 9
    Primary · Company recordAttributed to source
    American Express officially launched its Global Network Services (GNS) business in 1997, with earlier international card partnerships with banks dating to the 1970s.
  10. 10
    SecondaryWidely reported
    Amex's FY2024 full-year discount revenue totaled $35.2 billion, a 5% increase, making it by far Amex's largest revenue stream; net card fees soared 16% to $8.45 billion in the same year.
  11. 11
    SecondaryWidely reported
    American Express OptBlue was released in 2014, opening Amex transaction processing to third-party merchant account providers for merchants processing under $1 million in annual Amex sales.