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In 2015, activist investor Starboard Value held up Macy's and announced what it was really worth: not a department-store chain, but $21 billion of real estate hiding behind escalators and perfume counters — with individual flagships like Herald Square tagged at roughly $4 billion alone and San Francisco and Chicago each at over $1 billion.9 So Macy's tested the thesis. It sold four of those buildings — the San Francisco men's store, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, and part of Chicago — and collected, all in, $351 million: $250 million for San Francisco, $59 million for Minneapolis, $15 million for Pittsburgh, and $27 million for the Chicago portion.10 The market's answer to valuations of over $1 billion per building was a fraction of that. That number is the silent character in every fight Macy's has had since.
The official story is that Macy's is a stubborn dinosaur clinging to itself while smart money begs it to unlock value. The real story is that Macy's has done this math before, in public, with its own buildings — and discovered that an activist's valuation and a buyer's check are two very different documents.
The bid that arrived, grew, and quietly evaporated
On December 1, 2023, the investment firm Arkhouse and the asset manager Brigade made an unsolicited move to take Macy's private at $21 a share — about $5.8 billion. Macy's board looked at it and said no in January, citing a lack of compelling value and financing that wasn't real.1 In March, the bidders came back higher: $24 a share, roughly $6.6 billion, now waving fresh equity partners and a 51.3% premium to where the stock had traded before they showed up.2 It looked like momentum. It wasn't. After more than seven months of engagement, the board unanimously walked away in July 2024, again on the same two grounds — no certainty of financing, no compelling value — and turned back to its own plan.3 The richest offer in the saga didn't fail because Macy's couldn't see the upside. It failed because the buyers couldn't fund the downside.
What the appraisals were really measuring
Then came the second front. In December 2024, Barington Capital and Thor Equities published a presentation with a tidier theory: don't buy the whole thing, just unbundle it. Cut capital spending from about 4% of sales toward 1.5%–2%, buy back $2–3 billion of stock, carve the real estate into its own subsidiary, and explore selling off Bloomingdale's and Bluemercury.5 Underneath it all sat the familiar prize — a real estate portfolio Barington and Thor valued at $5 billion to $9 billion.6
Here is the thing the headline number hides. That same portfolio was being valued, at the same time, by people with no axe to grind — and they couldn't agree within a country mile. Evercore ISI put it at $5–7 billion. JP Morgan said $8.5 billion. TD Cowen stretched to $7.5–11.6 billion.6 Look at one building, Herald Square, and the disagreement becomes almost comic: Evercore saw $900 million to $1.5 billion; JP Morgan saw roughly $3 billion.6 When sober analysts value a single property anywhere across a 3x range, you are not looking at a price. You are looking at an argument. And an argument is exactly what an activist gets paid to make.
| What was estimated | What was paid | |
|---|---|---|
| Barington / Thor (2024) | $5B–$9B total portfolio | — |
| Independent analysts (2024) | $5B to $11.6B total; Herald Square $0.9B–$3B | — |
| 2015 activist estimate | $21B total; $3.3B for seven flagships | — |
| Four of those flagships, sold | — | $351 million, combined |
Why the portfolio is worth more bolted together
The breakup pitch treats Macy's as three things accidentally sharing a balance sheet: a struggling mid-market chain, a healthy luxury brand in Bloomingdale's, and a beauty business in Bluemercury. Set the strong ones free, the logic goes, and the market will finally pay full price for them. CEO Tony Spring, who took the job on February 4, 2024,11 has answered this directly. He won't spin off Bloomingdale's or Bluemercury — and not out of sentiment. He points to the plumbing: shared warehousing, shared legal and finance, shared back-end operations, and the leverage of negotiating with brands as one buyer across three banners instead of three smaller ones.7 A spun-off Bloomingdale's doesn't just lose a parent. It loses the cost base it was quietly riding on, and it walks into brand negotiations as a smaller customer. The synergy isn't a slogan. It's the discount you get for showing up bigger.
Meanwhile, Macy's was running its own counter-strategy in plain sight. Its 'Bold New Chapter,' launched February 2024, is a culling, not a fire sale: close roughly 150 underproductive stores through 2026, pour investment into the ~350 locations that work, expand Bloomingdale's and Bluemercury by up to 45 sites, and monetize $600–750 million in assets — a deliberate trickle, not a portfolio dump.4 It is the difference between pruning a tree and selling it for lumber.
The core trick of breakup activism is to substitute a sum-of-the-parts estimate for a real buyer. The two are not the same instrument. An estimate assumes a willing purchaser at the modeled price, frictionless tax treatment, and no disruption to the operating business during the carve-up. A bid carries financing, contingencies, and a person who actually has to pay. When the spread between competing estimates of a single asset runs 3x — and when the last real sale came in at a tenth of the hype — the prudent read is that the gap between appraisal and bid is precisely where the activist's profit, and the shareholder's risk, both live.
The honest case for the breakup
The fair objection is that incumbent boards always say this. 'Our parts are worth more together' is the standard defense of every management team that would rather not be dismembered, and sometimes it's self-serving cover for slow decline. Barington's capital-allocation critique isn't crazy: a chain in secular pressure pouring around 4% of sales into capex while its stock languishes is a legitimate target, and demanding that money flow to buybacks instead is a defensible read.5 If the turnaround had kept failing, 'trust us, the portfolio is worth more whole' would have been an empty incantation.
But the turnaround stopped failing. By fiscal 2025, Macy's reported positive annual comparable sales growth of 1.5% — its first in three years — with all three banners positive and Bloomingdale's notching its best holiday performance on record, all while closing 64 nameplate stores under the plan.8 That single data point reframes the entire debate. Resisting a breakup while comps fall is denial. Resisting one while comps turn positive is judgment. The activists were arguing the parts were worth more apart precisely as the parts started working better together.
Macy's keeps saying no for a reason simpler than stubbornness: it already ran the experiment. It held up its most famous buildings to an activist's appraisal, sold four of them, and learned that the gap between a pitch deck and a buyer's check is measured in billions. The breakup crowd offers a number. Macy's has a receipt. And a board that has read its own receipt is very hard to sell a number to twice.
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Sources
Where this comes from — the filings, records, and reporting behind it.
- 1Macy's board confirmed it received Arkhouse/Brigade's initial unsolicited proposal at $21.00 per share ($5.8B) on December 1, 2023, and publicly rejected it on January 21, 2024, citing lack of compelling value and unviable financing.
- 2Arkhouse and Brigade raised their offer to $24/share ($6.6B) on March 3, 2024, identifying Fortress Investment Group and One Investment Management US as additional equity capital partners, representing a 51.3% premium to Macy's Nov. 30, 2023 share price.
- 3Macy's board unanimously terminated discussions with Arkhouse and Brigade on July 15, 2024, after more than seven months of engagement, citing lack of certainty of financing and failure to deliver compelling value; the board committed to returning full focus to 'A Bold New Chapter' strategy.
- 4Macy's launched 'A Bold New Chapter' on February 27, 2024: closing ~150 underproductive locations through 2026, prioritizing investment in ~350 go-forward locations, expanding Bloomingdale's and Bluemercury by up to 45 locations, and targeting $600M–$750M in asset monetization through 2026.
- 5Barington Capital and Thor Equities published a presentation on December 9, 2024, demanding Macy's: (1) cut capex from ~4% to 1.5%–2% of sales; (2) repurchase $2B–$3B in stock over three years; (3) create an internal real estate subsidiary; and (4) explore strategic alternatives for Bloomingdale's and Bluemercury.
- 6Barington/Thor estimated Macy's total real estate portfolio at $5B–$9B and Herald Square specifically at $1.64B–$2.4B, while independent Wall Street estimates ranged widely: Evercore ISI $5B–$7B (Herald Square $900M–$1.5B), JP Morgan $8.5B total (Herald Square ~$3B), TD Cowen $7.5B–$11.6B.
- 7CEO Tony Spring, at NRF's 2025 Big Show in January 2025, explicitly rejected spinning off Bloomingdale's and Bluemercury, citing synergies in warehousing, legal, finance, back-end operations, and joint brand negotiation across the three-banner portfolio.
- 8By fiscal year 2025 (ended Feb 1, 2026), Macy's returned to positive annual comparable sales growth of 1.5%—the first time in three years—with Bloomingdale's achieving its best holiday performance on record in Q4 FY2025, and all three baneplates posting positive comparable sales; the company closed 64 Macy's nameplate locations under the Bold New Chapter plan.
- 9Starboard Value estimated Macy's real estate at $21 billion in 2015, with Herald Square alone valued at roughly $4 billion and stores in San Francisco and Chicago each worth more than $1 billion.
- 10Macy's sold its San Francisco men's store for $250 million, its Minneapolis flagship for $59 million, a portion of its Chicago Loop flagship for $27 million, and its Pittsburgh flagship for $15 million — totaling $351 million — which Evercore said dismantled Starboard's valuation.
- 11Tony Spring became CEO of Macy's, Inc. effective February 4, 2024, succeeding Jeff Gennette.
- 12Starboard Value assumed seven flagship locations in other cities were worth $3.3 billion, in addition to its $4 billion estimate for Herald Square.