The Pricing Lens
Why has the pricing evolved the way it has?
Held over settled: 56 records whose verdict is in, from forks between 1899–2025, with 3 still too early to call and counted in neither. This is what happened to the companies on record, not the odds for your decision. The corpus covers decisions documented well enough to verify, which skews toward companies that lasted long enough to be written about.
NIO, Netflix, Stellantis, Kering (Gucci), American Express, McDonald's, T-Mobile, Adobe and 39 more faced this decision. Below is what was on the table, what each chose, and what it returned.
The record
- 2020
NIO
Held in partWhether to sell the car with the battery removed and rent the battery back via a company-owned swap network
Stated reasonLifting the battery off the sticker removes sticker shock and range/degradation anxiety while converting a one-time sale into recurring subscription revenue and lock-in
CommittedRMB 200 million (NIO's equity investment (25%) to establish Wuhan Weineng Battery Asset Co.)
What happenedRead the full analysis →- 2024 swap business profit/loss: swap business lost an analyst-reported RMB 3.12 billion, stations averaging 32 sessions a day
- 2024 Shanghai station utilization: more than 150 stations each handling over 100 swaps a day, past break-even
- 2024 deliveries and net loss: delivered 221,970 vehicles, up nearly 39%, with a RMB 22.4 billion net loss
- 2022
Netflix
HeldWhether to start charging for password sharing across its markets
Stated reasonIt could not raise prices or sell ads against an audience where nearly half the seats were free
What happenedRead the full analysis →- 2023 paid subscribers added in Q2 2023: added 5.89 million paid subscribers against an analyst consensus of about 1.77 million
- 2023 UCAN paid memberships: gained 5.83 million paid memberships across 2023, reversing a loss of roughly 919 thousand the year before
- 2023 Q4 2023 net additions: 13.1 million net additions, its biggest fourth quarter ever
- 2022
Stellantis
ReversedWhether to widen Jeep and Ram's price premium past 20% above the market on the bet that brand loyalty would absorb it
Stated reasonThe company priced up because its margin targets needed it to and assumed the brand moat would pay the difference
What happenedRead the full analysis →- 2024 U.S. market share: fell from 10.2% (H1 2023) to 8.4% (H1 2024), down 180 basis points
- 2024 U.S. sales: full-year 2024 U.S. sales down approximately 15% year over year
- 2024 net profit: full-year 2024 revenue down 17%, net profit down 70%, AOI margin 5.5%, industrial free cash flow negative €6 billion
- 2023
Kering (Gucci)
Held in partTrade Gucci's entry-level volume for higher-end positioning ('premiumization') via a restrained creative reset
Stated reasonStrip the brand back to its more universal, iconic qualities and become more selective about distribution to trade volume for prestige
What happenedRead the full analysis →- 2024 Gucci revenue: €7.7 billion, down 23% as reported
- 2024 Directly operated retail (91% of business): down 21% on a comparable basis
- 2024 Wholesale revenue: fell 28%, and 53% in the fourth quarter
- 1991
American Express
HeldFaced with a 250-restaurant boycott over its ~4% merchant fee, should Amex cut the fee or defend and diversify its pricing?
Stated reasonIts one price was a single point of failure, so it rebuilt to be paid by merchant, cardholder, and borrower on the same transaction
What happenedRead the full analysis →- 2018 Supreme Court ruling on anti-steering provisions: Court affirmed 5-4 that the provisions did not violate the Sherman Act
- 2025-09 Platinum annual fee: fee reached $895
- 2025 Net card fees vs discount revenue growth: net card fees grew 20% year-over-year while discount revenue grew 6%
- 2002
McDonald's
ReversedWhether to launch a nationally advertised Dollar Menu that would pull franchisee prices back down without issuing an order
Stated reasonA nationally advertised $1 price forced franchisees charging more to pull prices down, since customers felt cheated and walked next door
What happenedRead the full analysis →- 2003-11 U.S. comparable sales: record U.S. comparable sales up 10.2%, with the chairman naming the Dollar Menu as a driver
- 2006 franchisee price premium on Big Mac meal: premium collapsed from 12.5% to 3.63%
- 2008 product spec on Dollar Menu: Double Cheeseburger left the Dollar Menu and the McDouble, minus a slice, took its place at $1
- 2013
T-Mobile
Held in partWhether to remove industry switching costs (contracts, ETFs, subsidies) as a growth-phase disruptor weapon or compete on the incumbents' terms
Stated reasonA challenger with the fewest customers to lose has the most to gain by making switching free, because friction was protecting the incumbents' base, not its own
What happenedRead the full analysis →- 2020-04 subscriber standing: roughly 80 million subscribers at merger close, past AT&T's 75 million but behind Verizon's 114 million
- 2024 legacy plan pricing: raised prices on older legacy plans by $2 or $5 per line
- 2024 postpaid service revenue: $52.3B in FY2024, up from $48.7B in 2023 and $45.9B in 2022
- 2013
Adobe
HeldWhether to stop selling perpetual Photoshop licenses and move entirely to Creative Cloud subscriptions
Stated reasonAdobe was solving lumpy upgrade cycles and rampant piracy of expensive perpetual licenses by making leaving expensive and revenue predictable
What happenedRead the full analysis →- 2024-06-17 FTC complaint filed: DOJ for the FTC filed a complaint alleging hidden terms and a 50% early termination fee
- 2026-03-13 settlement: Adobe agreed to a $150 million settlement resolving the FTC case
- 2013 total revenue: total revenue slipped from $4.40 billion to $4.06 billion
- 2014
Starbucks
Held in partWhether to launch Mobile Order & Pay to remove front-end line friction
Stated reasonThe app turned anonymous foot traffic into a named, re-targetable customer base and was expected to drive loyalty acquisition and retention
What happenedRead the full analysis →- 2017 same-store sales: 3% same-store sales result, the weakest since 2009, attributed primarily to mobile-order congestion at the handoff counter
- 2024 app transaction share: 31% of total transactions at U.S. company-operated stores were made via the mobile app — a new record
- 2024 uncompleted mobile orders: a mid-teens percent of mobile orders went uncompleted due to volume
- 2015
Tesla
Held in partHow to acquire customers cheaply while claiming to spend nothing on advertising
Stated reasonAcquire a customer for less than a Super Bowl spot costs, cheaper than legacy media
What happenedRead the full analysis →- 2019-02-02 Referral program restructuring: Tesla shut down Phase 9
- 2019-03-22 Referral program relaunch: Relaunched restructured version paying in Supercharging miles and sweepstakes, citing cost
- 2024-04 Paid advertising on X: Disclosed it had spent $200,000 advertising on X through February 2024
- 2019
Disney
Held in partPrice Disney+ as a cheap loss leader to grab the household, then raise the rent later
Stated reasonThe low price was chosen to maximize reach as the company's first serious foray into streaming
What happenedRead the full analysis →- 2024 combined streaming operating income: $47M operating profit vs a loss of $512M the year before
- 2024 Entertainment DTC operating loss (ex-ESPN+): Disney+ and Hulu still reported an operating loss of $19M
- 2024-10 Disney+ ad-free price: raised to $15.99 from a $6.99 launch
- 2022
Nestle
ReversedDuring a cost spike, absorb input costs and compress margin, or pass costs through to shoppers and hold the margin?
Stated reasonStrong brands allowed price increases that protected the margin through severe cost inflation, and in the short run it worked.
What happenedRead the full analysis →- 2023 UTOP margin: margin held at 17.3%
- 2023 real internal growth (volume + mix): turned negative at -0.3% in 2023
- 2024-09-01 CEO leadership: board replaced Schneider with Freixe effective 1 September 2024 after a cut growth forecast