Adidas Just Beat Nike at Its Own Game. It Still Doesn't Have a Moat.
In 2024 Adidas grew revenue 12% currency-neutral while Nike crawled at 1%, and its global sportswear share climbed to 8.9% as Nike's slipped to 14.1%. But the engine driving the comeback is two reissued 1960s sneakers - and that's the same trap that just caught Nike.
Comes with a free Moat Anatomy Canvas template.
Look down at the sneakers under half the tables in any city café and you'll see the same flat suede gum-soled shoe, often in two or three colorways: the Samba and the Gazelle, two designs that are essentially as old as the moon landing. They are why Adidas had the best year of its recent life. In 2024 the company grew revenue 12% currency-neutral to €23.7 billion, lifted gross margin to 50.8%, and added more than €1 billion of operating profit.1 In the same window, Nike - five times its size at $51.4 billion - grew its top line by all of 1%.2 The perpetual #2 had outrun the king. The strange part is what it ran on: not a breakthrough, but a reissue.
The official story is that Adidas is structurally stuck behind Nike - a permanent second place, scarred half to death by the Kanye West collapse. Both halves of that are wrong. The Yeezy wound has been cleaned and closed. And the gap with Nike is not a fixed feature of the universe; it's a number that just moved in Adidas's favor. The real risk facing Adidas isn't being #2. It's that the thing carrying it to the moment looks exactly like the thing that just sank #1.
The gap everyone calls permanent just narrowed
"World's #2 sportswear brand" is repeated as if it were a law of physics. The data says it's a snapshot, and the snapshot is changing. GlobalData put Nike's share of the global sportswear market at 14.1% in 2024, down from 15.2% the year before; Adidas climbed to 8.9% from 8.2%.3 One leader shed more than a point of global share in a single year while the challenger gained nearly a point. That's not a moat holding - that's a moat leaking, with New Balance, On Running, and Hoka wading into the puddle.3 The honest caveat: these are broad market figures covering apparel and footwear, and the gap looks wider or narrower depending on which slice and which vendor you pick. But the direction of travel is the same in any framing. The distance is closing.
| Adidas (2024) | Nike (FY2024) | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | €23.7B | $51.4B |
| Top-line growth | +12% currency-neutral | +1% currency-neutral |
| Global sportswear share | 8.9%, rising from 8.2% | 14.1%, falling from 15.2% |
| Direction | Gaining | Bleeding share |
The deeper irony is why Nike was bleeding. Its stumble came from leaning too hard into a direct-to-consumer pivot built around a handful of heritage franchises - Air Force 1, Dunk, Air Jordan - flooding the market until the scarcity that made them desirable evaporated. Nike didn't lose to a better shoe. It lost to its own monoculture: too few products, sold too hard, until the magic wore thin. NIKE Direct alone was $21.5 billion of that machine.2 Adidas, watching from second place, won the year by being the alternative to a leader who tripped over its own hits.
The Yeezy scar everyone points to is already healed
Here is the second myth worth dismantling. Adidas's deal with Kanye West is told as a tale of poaching - Adidas snatching a star from Nike in 2013. The truth is duller and more telling: West left Nike because Nike wouldn't pay him royalties on Yeezy sneaker sales, offering a charity donation instead. Adidas simply agreed to share the economics Nike refused to.8 That willingness to pay a creator a real cut - reportedly around 11% - built a line whose sneaker sales approached $1.7 billion a year before it ended.8
When Adidas terminated the partnership in October 2022 after West's antisemitic remarks, it warned of up to €250 million in short-term hit to that year's net income and held on to all design rights to existing products and colorways.4 What it did next is the part the "existential scar" narrative ignores: it monetized the wreckage on its own terms. Adidas's 2022 report recorded more than €1.2 billion of Yeezy revenue - not the $2 billion an analyst estimated, but real money.6 Then it sold through roughly €750 million of leftover inventory in 2023 and €650 million in 2024, draining the warehouse rather than torching it.6 By 2024, the global business was growing 12% with that crutch all but gone. A company that can lose its single biggest franchise and grow double digits two years later does not have a Yeezy problem.
Winning the moment, missing the moat
So if Adidas isn't doomed to second place and isn't crippled by Yeezy, what's actually wrong? The same thing that just cost Nike a point of share. Look again at what drove the 2024 surge: terrace classics, the Samba and Gazelle, two reissued silhouettes riding a fashion wave. They are wonderful for the moment - low cost, high margin, instantly recognizable. But they are franchises, not a factory. A trend that lifts you can drop you, and a brand whose growth depends on whether a 1960s shoe is fashionable this season is renting its momentum, not owning it. That is the precise monoculture that hollowed out Nike's DTC story: too few hits, scaled too aggressively, until the scarcity that made them special turned into saturation that made them ordinary.
Adidas grew 12% in 2024 while Nike grew 1%12, and a chunk of that came from a small set of lifestyle silhouettes catching a fashion wave. That's an enviable moment. It is not a durable moat, because a fashion wave reverses, and a brand that owns the moment but not the engine that produced it is one trend-cycle away from giving the share right back - the same way Nike just did.
“the sole owner of all design rights to existing products as well as previous and new colorways under the partnership”4
Isn't a 12% year proof enough?
The fair objection is that this is too cautious. A company growing 12% with a 50.8% gross margin and a billion-euro jump in operating profit is not in any obvious trouble1 - and surely "runs on iconic franchises" describes every great consumer brand, Nike included, for decades. True. The difference is concentration and geography. Adidas's strength is not evenly spread: North America, the market where Nike and even Jordan as a sub-brand have historically sat above it, saw Adidas revenues fall 2% in 2024 to €5.13 billion, dragged by cautious wholesale and the last of the Yeezy wind-down.7 The global #2 title doesn't extend uniformly to the biggest sportswear market on earth. So the steelman holds for one year. The question a moat answers is the next ten - and a moat is what you have when the trend turns against you and the share stays. Adidas hasn't been tested on that yet.
When a challenger overtakes a leader during a fashion cycle, ask one question before calling it a turnaround: did the share come from a structural advantage, or from a product that happens to be hot? The two feel identical on the income statement and behave oppositely when the cycle turns. Nike's recent stumble wasn't a bad shoe - it was over-reliance on a few heritage silhouettes scaled until they lost their scarcity. Adidas just gained share partly on the same playbook, riding the Samba and Gazelle. The lesson cuts both ways: the most dangerous moment for a brand is the one right after a franchise wins big, because that's exactly when management mistakes a trend for a moat and stops building the next thing.
Adidas was registered on 18 August 1949 - not the storied 1948 of the brothers' famous split, and never a backronym for anything you've heard.5 It was just Adi Dassler's nickname stitched to his surname, a craftsman who outlasted his brother's head start. That's the better frame for today. Adidas is not condemned to second place; it just proved it can take share off a stumbling giant in a single year. What it hasn't proven is that it owns the moment rather than borrowing it. The Samba is a beautiful shoe and a terrible moat. Adidas is winning. The harder, more valuable trick is to still be winning the year the suede goes out of style.
When the challenger and the leader trade places
Moat Anatomy Canvas
A one-page canvas that dissects a moat instead of asserting it: where the advantage comes from, how much of the market it covers, how long it would take to copy, and what keeps it from eroding. Blank to dissect your own claimed edge; filled as the worked example tracing the structure of the story's defensible advantage. Use it to tell a real moat from a head start.
The worked example unlocks with a subscription. See plans →
Sources
Where this comes from — the filings, records, and reporting behind it.
- 1Adidas AG revenues were €23,683 million in 2024, up 11% in euro terms (12% currency-neutral) from €21,427 million in 2023; gross margin improved 3.3pp to 50.8%; full-year operating profit increased more than €1 billion to €1,337 million.
- 2Nike, Inc. full-year fiscal 2024 revenues (year ended 31 May 2024) were $51.4 billion, up 1% currency-neutral versus $51.2 billion in fiscal 2023; NIKE Direct revenues were $21.5 billion.
- 3Nike's share of the global sportswear market fell to 14.1% in 2024 from 15.2% in 2023; Adidas's share rose to 8.9% from 8.2%; other gainers included New Balance, On Running, and Hoka (source: GlobalData, as reported by Reuters/Yahoo Finance, February 2025).
- 4Adidas terminated its partnership with Ye (Kanye West) on 25 October 2022, citing antisemitic remarks; the company stated it is 'the sole owner of all design rights to existing products as well as previous and new colorways under the partnership' and projected a short-term negative impact of up to €250 million on 2022 net income.
- 5Adidas AG was formally registered on 18 August 1949 by Adolf ('Adi') Dassler as a portmanteau of 'Adi' and 'Das(sler)'; the name was not a backronym. Rudolf Dassler had registered Puma (initially 'Ruda') in January 1948. The Adi Dassler Memorial Foundation's own chronicle confirms this timeline.
- 6Adidas's 2022 annual report recorded 'more than €1,200 million' of Yeezy revenues in 2022; ~€750M was sold through in 2023 and ~€650M in 2024 as remaining inventory was cleared. The commonly cited $2B figure was a Morningstar analyst estimate (attributed-to-source), not a company-disclosed revenue figure.
- 7Adidas North America revenues declined 2% in 2024 to €5,128 million, primarily due to conservative wholesale sell-in and lower Yeezy sales, even as global revenues grew 11%; North America did return to double-digit growth in Q4 2024.
- 8Kanye West left Nike in 2013 primarily because Nike would not pay him royalties on Yeezy shoe sales, instead offering a charity donation; the Adidas partnership was announced in November 2013. West's royalty was approximately 11%, and annual Yeezy sneaker sales reached nearly $1.7 billion before the termination.