John Deere Sells You the Tractor. The Repair Is the Subscription.
A farmer who owns a $500,000 combine still can't fully fix it - the diagnostic software is redacted by design. Deere's parts and services revenue grew 22% from 2013-2019 while equipment sales fell 19%. The lock-in isn't a bug; it's the business model, and the FTC is now in court over it.
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A farmer in Nebraska owns a half-million-dollar combine outright. No lease, no note - it's his. One August afternoon, in the narrow window when the crop has to come in or rot, a sensor fails. He has the replacement part in his shop. He bolts it in. And the machine refuses to run, because the new part has to be authorized by a piece of software he is not allowed to have. The nearest dealer is hours away and booked solid. The harvest doesn't wait, but the software does. He owns the steel. He does not own the permission.
The official story is that John Deere sells tractors and combines - heavy machinery, the most American business there is. That isn't wrong; it's incomplete in the most lucrative way. The machine is the down payment. The real product is everything that happens after the sale: the parts, the diagnostics, the authorized repair you can't route around. Deere figured out that the durable revenue isn't in the metal you buy once. It's in the permission you have to keep asking for.
The numbers point away from the equipment
Follow the money and the strategy stops being subtle. Between 2013 and 2019, Deere's parts sales grew 22% - while sales of new agricultural equipment fell 19% over the very same stretch.8 Sit with that. The thing the company is famous for selling shrank by a fifth, and the thing it sells after the sale grew by a fifth. New-equipment demand rides a brutal commodity cycle: when crop prices sag, nobody buys a new combine. But the combines already in the field still break, still need parts, still need that authorizing software. Aftermarket revenue is insulated from the cycle precisely because a broken machine has no opinion about corn futures. That's why Deere reports 'Production & Precision Agriculture' as its own segment7 - it is naming the profit center, not hiding it.
How a copyright law became a repair lock
The lock has a legal architecture, and it was built deliberately. In 2015 the Librarian of Congress carved out an exemption to the DMCA establishing that repairing your own agricultural equipment is not copyright infringement.5 On paper, that should have settled it. It settled nothing - because the ruling said you may repair, not that the manufacturer must hand you the tools to do it. Deere read the gap exactly. Right after the exemption, it updated its End User License Agreement to contractually forbid modification and third-party repair, which the Electronic Frontier Foundation flagged in December 2016.5 The customer won the right to repair and lost it again in a clause. You bought the tractor; you agreed not to fix it. The copyright fight was theater over a door that the contract had already bolted shut from the inside.
The enforcement mechanism in the field is more elegant still: two tools, not one. Dealers get the full diagnostic software, Service ADVISOR. Owners get a hobbled cousin, Customer Service ADVISOR, that redacts the information needed to complete the job - the detail Senator Elizabeth Warren's October 2024 letter to Deere's CEO called 'impaired tools and inadequate disclosures.'2 So the part fits, the bolts torque, and the machine still won't clear itself until a dealer types the blessing. The chokepoint isn't the wrench. It's the keystroke.
| Owner (Customer Service ADVISOR) | Authorized dealer (Service ADVISOR) | |
|---|---|---|
| Diagnostic data | Redacted in key areas | Full access |
| Authorize a new part | Often blocked | Yes |
| Cost of the gap | A trip to the dealer, on the dealer's schedule | — |
| Who profits from the gap | — | Deere's parts-and-services segment |
The 'right-to-repair deal' that was built to stop right-to-repair
Here is the move almost everyone misread. On January 8, 2023, Deere signed a Memorandum of Understanding hailed as a right-to-repair breakthrough.1 It was signed not with farmers but with the American Farm Bureau Federation - a lobbying organization. And read what AFBF gave up: in exchange for a pledge of limited tool access, it agreed to 'refrain from introducing, promoting, or supporting' federal or state right-to-repair legislation.1 That is the whole trade. Deere bought peace from the loudest lobby in farm country, and the price was the lobby's silence on the only thing that could actually force change - a binding law. The MOU has no enforcement mechanism and lets either party walk away on 15 days' notice.10 It was not a concession to repair. It was a firebreak against legislation, dressed as a concession.
“...impaired tools and inadequate disclosures.”2
And the firebreak didn't hold. Colorado refused the bargain. On April 25, 2023 - months after the MOU - Governor Jared Polis signed the first state right-to-repair law for farm equipment, in force January 1, 2024, requiring manufacturers to give owners and independent shops the same parts, tools, and information they give dealers.6 That law mandates by statute exactly the parity the MOU only gestured at. Which tells you what the MOU was really worth as a substitute for a law: nothing the moment a legislature declined to be reassured by it.
Isn't this just necessary complexity, not a scheme?
The honest objection deserves a real hearing: modern farm equipment is a rolling computer, emissions systems are federally regulated, and a botched repair on a $500,000 machine can be a safety and compliance disaster. From that angle, locking the diagnostics looks less like greed and more like liability management - keeping unqualified hands out of certified systems. That argument has weight. But it doesn't survive the details. If the goal were safety, the customer tool wouldn't be deliberately redacted to require a dealer for routine work; you'd give owners full information and hold them accountable for misuse, the way every other regulated trade does. If the goal were compliance, Deere wouldn't have used a copyright exemption's loophole to bolt the EULA shut5 the instant the law tilted toward owners. And the cleanest tell is the money: a position built purely on safety doesn't show up as a parts segment growing 22% while equipment sales fall.8 The complexity is real. The decision to monetize the complexity by withholding the key - that's the strategy, and it's the part now standing in front of a federal judge.
The most durable aftermarket isn't built on physical scarcity - it's built on a software gate the customer needs and only you control. Once a product becomes a computer, the manufacturer can sell the hardware at one price and meter the right to *use it fully* at another, indefinitely. The tells are always the same: a deliberately crippled customer tool, a EULA that forbids what the law allows, and a 'voluntary' deal offered precisely to head off a binding one. The catch is that this position looks like a service and behaves like a tax - which is exactly what draws antitrust regulators and right-to-repair statutes. A lock-in defended by genuine value survives; one defended by withheld keystrokes invites the lawsuit that ends it.
The legal walls are now being tested where it counts. The private farmer class action that Deere wanted thrown out was not thrown out; it proceeded and settled for $99 million - Deere announced the agreement on April 6, 2026,4 the court granted preliminary approval on May 18, 2026, and a final fairness hearing is set for October 29, 2026.9 And the bigger threat is still live: on January 15, 2025, the FTC and the Illinois and Minnesota attorneys general sued Deere for monopolizing repair services through the two-tier Service ADVISOR tool, with Michigan, Wisconsin, and Arizona joining via an amended complaint filed in February 2025 - and that case survived Deere's motion to dismiss.11 A settlement closes a chapter; a surviving federal monopolization suit opens the whole strategy to discovery. The thing Deere built to be invisible is now the thing on trial.
John Deere didn't accidentally make tractors hard to fix. It made a deliberate trade: less of each machine owned by the buyer, more of each machine's life owned by the dealer network. The genius was recognizing that once a combine became a computer, the durable money moved from the steel to the software key - and that a key is far easier to defend than a market. The flaw was forgetting that a tax everyone can feel eventually finds a regulator. Deere sold the tractor and kept the permission. It is now discovering, in open court, what permission is worth once a farmer - and the federal government - decides to take it back.
Switching-Cost Ledger
A worksheet that prices the exit. It itemizes every cost a customer eats to switch away — the contract penalties, the re-training, the data migration, the muscle memory — so you can see whether lock-in is real or just inertia waiting to break. Blank to audit your own stickiness; filled as the worked example tallying the switching costs the story's customers face.
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Sources
Where this comes from — the filings, records, and reporting behind it.
- 1The AFBF–John Deere Memorandum of Understanding was signed January 8, 2023; AFBF agreed to 'refrain from introducing, promoting, or supporting federal or state Right to Repair legislation' beyond the MOU's commitments; the MOU has no enforcement mechanism and allows exit with 30-day notice.
- 2Senator Elizabeth Warren's October 2, 2024 letter to Deere CEO John May accused Deere of providing 'impaired tools and inadequate disclosures,' not living up to the MOU, and potentially violating the Clean Air Act by restricting emissions-related repairs.
- 3The FTC, Illinois, and Minnesota filed a federal antitrust lawsuit against Deere on January 15, 2025 (FTC v. Deere & Co., No. 3:25-cv-50017, N.D. Ill.), alleging monopolization of repair services via the two-tier Service ADVISOR diagnostic tool; Michigan, Wisconsin, and Arizona subsequently joined; the case survived Deere's motion to dismiss as of June 2025.
- 4The private class action (In re: Deere & Co. Repair Servs. Antitrust Litig., No. 3:22-cv-50188, N.D. Ill.) was not dismissed; Deere agreed to pay $99 million to settle; the settlement was approved April 6, 2026, but does not end the separate FTC lawsuit.
- 5The 2015 Librarian of Congress ruling established that repairing agricultural equipment is not a copyright infringement under DMCA Section 1201, but did not require manufacturers to make diagnostic tools available. EFF documented that Deere subsequently updated its EULA to contractually prohibit modification and third-party repair, effectively nullifying the exemption.
- 6Colorado Gov. Jared Polis signed the first state right-to-repair law for farm equipment on April 25, 2023; it went into effect January 1, 2024, requiring manufacturers to give owners and independent shops the same parts, tools, and information provided to authorized dealers.
- 7Deere's FY2024 net income was $7.100 billion ($25.62/share), down from $10.166 billion ($34.63/share) in FY2023, and worldwide net sales decreased 16% to $51.716 billion for full-year FY2024; the company reports a 'Production & Precision Agriculture' segment, confirming services/precision ag as a distinct profit center.
- 8Parts sales for Deere grew 22% between 2013 and 2019 even as new ag equipment sales fell 19% over the same period; profits swelled nearly 270% from 2020 through fiscal 2023, per Deere's SEC filings — with aftermarket parts and services as the consistent profit driver insulated from the equipment demand cycle.
- 9Preliminary approval of the $99 million settlement was granted May 18, 2026 by U.S. District Judge Iain Johnston; producers have until Sept. 14, 2026 to object; final fairness hearing is scheduled for Oct. 29, 2026.
- 10The MOU's Section I states that upon enactment of any relevant legislation or regulation, each party may withdraw upon fifteen (15) days written notice.
- 11The FTC filed the original lawsuit on January 15, 2025 along with the Illinois and Minnesota Attorneys General only; Arizona, Michigan, and Wisconsin joined via an amended complaint filed February 7, 2025.