The Thursday before
Picture the strategy lead on the Thursday before a Monday offsite. The venue is booked, the dinner is booked, the facilitator has sent a playlist. The deck is at 140 slides and still growing, because three executives sent sections that afternoon. Nobody has agreed which numbers are right. Nobody has said what the room is supposed to decide. On Monday morning the first four hours go to presenting the deck.
Here is the direct answer. Pre-work for a strategy offsite is everything that has to be true before the room can decide: the decisions written as questions, one named decider, agreed facts, real options written up at their strongest, each attendee's view heard in private, and a pre-read that went out in time to be read. The checklist below runs from six weeks out to 48 hours before, and ends in a readiness gate.
The thesis: an offsite is decided before anyone arrives. The day itself can only choose among what the pre-work prepared. If the questions, facts, options and decider are not settled beforehand, the offsite will spend its scarce hours producing them, badly and in public. And if the readiness gate fails, the right move is to change the meeting, not to hope.
The offsite is where you decide. The weeks before are where deciding becomes possible.
What the pre-work is for
Leadership teams have very little time for strategy. Michael Mankins reported in 2004 that most leadership teams spend just three hours per month making strategic decisions, often on unfocused, inconclusive discussion 1. An offsite is a rare block of that time. Every hour spent establishing facts or discovering what the question is comes out of the deciding.
The best-run decision processes separate the work into stages. At Textron, as Michael Mankins and Richard Steele describe it, each strategic issue was settled in two sessions: in the first, the management committee agreed on the relevant facts and generated several viable alternatives; in the second, it evaluated them and chose 2. Pre-work is the first session done on paper and in one-on-one conversations, so that the offsite can be the second.
- Turn topics into decisions. “Our international business” is a topic. “Do we exit Brazil or restructure it by June?” is a decision.
- Settle the facts in advance. A room that argues about numbers never gets to the choice.
- Lay out real options. Not a recommendation with two straw men next to it.
- Hear every view in private first. People say things one-on-one that they will not say in front of the CEO.
- Give people time to read. A pre-read that arrives the night before gets presented, not read.
The offsite agenda builder shapes the day itself. This page is about the weeks before it.
Six to four weeks out: frame the decisions
- ☐ The decisions are written as questions, each with at least two real answers, and there are no more than three of them.
- ☐ One decider is named for each decision, and has agreed to decide in the room or within a stated number of days after.
- ☐ The attendee list is set by the decisions, not by seniority alone: everyone needed to decide or to carry out the decision, and few others.
- ☐ The offsite's type is clear: a session to agree facts and options, a session to choose, or both. Two days that try to do both for a new strategy may need a gap between them for homework.
- ☐ Operating topics are explicitly off the agenda and assigned to another meeting. Mankins recommends dealing with strategy and operations in separate meetings so operations do not crowd out strategy 1.
- ☐ A pre-work owner is named, with time freed to do the work, and a date for the readiness gate is in the calendar.
Four to two weeks out: facts, views and options
- ☐ Every attendee has had a 30-minute one-on-one with the pre-work owner: what they think the right answer is, what worries them, what they need to see to change their mind, and what they will not say in the room.
- ☐ A facts pack exists for each decision: the few numbers the options turn on, one page per decision, with sources. Where a number is disputed, both versions are shown with the reason they differ.
- ☐ The facts pack has been checked by the people most likely to dispute it before it goes in the pre-read, not after.
- ☐ Each decision has at least three real options, written at their strongest, ideally each drafted by someone who believes in it. Mankins advises evaluating at least three viable alternatives, not minor variations on one theme, before approving any strategy 1.
- ☐ Each option states what would have to be true for it to be the right choice.
- ☐ A short premortem survey has gone out: assume the leading option was chosen and has failed two years from now; list the most likely reasons. This borrows Gary Klein's premortem, in which a team imagines that a plan has already failed and generates plausible reasons why 4. Collect answers anonymously and summarize them in the pre-read.
The one-on-ones are the step most often skipped, and the one that most changes the day. They tell you where the real disagreement is, which is rarely where the deck assumes it is. They also let a junior attendee's best objection reach the room as a summarized point, without anyone having to raise it against their boss.
The pre-read week
- ☐ The pre-read goes out at least five working days before. Our rule of thumb; what matters is that people have time to read it twice.
- ☐ Every document is labeled for information, for discussion or for decision. Mankins recommends specifying why participants must read each item 1.
- ☐ There is one decision memo per decision: the question, the facts, the options at their strongest, what would have to be true for each, the premortem summary and who decides. Written as prose, a few pages, not a slide deck. The narrative memo page shows the format.
- ☐ The total pre-read can be read in about two hours. Appendices are marked optional.
- ☐ The decider has not announced a preference in the pre-read. Facts and options are settled in advance; the choice is not.
- ☐ Two or three attendees have confirmed they have read it and flagged anything unclear, so the gaps get fixed before the day, not discovered during it.
Forty-eight hours before: the readiness gate
Two days before, the pre-work owner and the decider go through eight questions together. They take ten minutes. They decide what kind of meeting Monday will be.
| # | Readiness question | If the answer is no |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Is each decision written as a question with at least two real answers? | Stop. Rescope the day as a session to frame the decisions. |
| 2 | Is one decider named for each decision? | Stop. Settle it before anything else. |
| 3 | Are the facts each decision turns on agreed, or the disagreement explained? | Turn the first half day into a facts session; move the choice to a follow-up. |
| 4 | Does each decision have at least three real options, written at their strongest? | Drop that decision from the day, or spend the session building the options. |
| 5 | Has every attendee had a one-on-one? | Hold the missing ones by phone before the day. |
| 6 | Did the pre-read go out at least five working days ago? | Cut the agenda to the decisions whose memos went out on time. |
| 7 | Are operating topics off the agenda? | Move them to another meeting. |
| 8 | Is the follow-up set: who writes the decisions down, sent to whom, by when? | Assign it now. |
Questions 1 and 2 are hard stops. Without them, the day cannot produce a decision, only a discussion. Questions 3 and 4 change what the day is for. A team that admits on Saturday that it is not ready to choose can still have a very good Monday: one spent agreeing the facts and building options, with the choice scheduled for a short session two weeks later. That is Textron's two-session pattern 2, adopted honestly rather than by accident.
The case against pre-work
The strongest objection is that pre-work pre-decides. Once the options are written, the facts agreed and every executive interviewed, the outcome is settled in hallways and one-on-ones, and the offsite becomes theater. Some leaders want the room to wrestle with the raw problem, because the wrestling is how a team commits.
Part of that is right. Pre-work can be used to manage the room instead of to prepare it. The guard is to be strict about what pre-work settles and what it does not:
- Pre-work settles the facts and the options. The room makes the choice. A pre-read that recommends is a different document, and should say so.
- Each option is written by someone who believes in it. If the pre-work owner writes all three, the favorite will be written best.
- Dissent arrives intact. The premortem summary and the one-on-one notes go in the pre-read, including the views the organizer disagrees with.
- The decider stays quiet until the choice. Announcing a preference in advance turns a decision meeting into a ratification.
There is a second-order problem for senior strategists. At scale, the pre-work owner, often the head of strategy or a chief of staff, gains real power over the outcome by choosing which options get written and which facts count. That power is the job. Use it visibly: publish the list of options considered and dropped, and why.
The deeper point stands. A team cannot wrestle productively with a problem it has not been given the facts to understand. Offsites that skip pre-work do not get a more authentic debate. They get a debate about the numbers, which ends at lunch, and a hurried choice at four o'clock.
After the gate, and after the day
The pre-work also sets up what happens next. The person named in readiness question 8 writes each decision down in the words used in the room, with the owner, the resources and the first milestone, and sends it within a few days. Mankins recommends explicitly agreeing on what was decided and specifying the resources required 1. The strategy execution page covers the weeks after that.
Run the checklist once and the pattern becomes obvious. The offsite was never the event. It was the deadline for the real work, and the day itself just reads out the result.
Questions
- What pre-work should be done before a strategy offsite?
- Write the decisions as questions and name a decider for each; interview every attendee one-on-one; agree the facts each decision turns on; write at least three real options at their strongest; run a short premortem survey; and send a labeled pre-read at least five working days before. Then hold a readiness check 48 hours ahead.
- How far in advance should an offsite pre-read be sent?
- Our rule of thumb is at least five working days, so attendees can read it twice and raise questions before the day. Label each document as for information, discussion or decision, keep the total to about two hours of reading, and confirm with two or three attendees that it is clear.
- What if the team is not ready to make a decision at the offsite?
- Change the meeting rather than force the choice. If the facts are disputed or the options are weak, use the day to agree the facts and build the options, then schedule a shorter session to choose. If the decisions are not framed or no decider is named, fix that first.
- Does pre-work make the offsite pointless?
- Not if it settles the right things. Pre-work should settle the facts and the options, while the choice stays with the room and the named decider. Have each option written by someone who believes in it, include dissent in the pre-read, and keep the decider from announcing a preference in advance.
Sources
- Mankins, M. C. (2004). Stop Wasting Valuable Time. Harvard Business Review, September 2004; summary published by Bain & Company. The article's Idea in Brief and Idea in Practice: most leadership teams spend about three hours per month making strategic decisions, often on unfocused, inconclusive discussion; deal with strategy and operations separately; distribute reading in advance and specify why participants must read it; evaluate at least three viable alternatives; explicitly agree on what was decided and specify the resources required.
- Mankins, M. C., and Steele, R. (2006). Stop Making Plans; Start Making Decisions. Harvard Business Review, January 2006; summary published by Bain & Company. Idea in Practice: at Textron, one session to agree the relevant facts and generate viable alternatives, a second to evaluate them and select a course of action.
- Rumelt, R. P. (2011). The perils of bad strategy. McKinsey Quarterly, June 2011, adapted from Good Strategy/Bad Strategy (Crown Business, 2011). The 1992 Digital Equipment Corporation strategy meeting, the request for consensus and the compromise statement described as “not a strategy.”
- Klein, G. (2007). Performing a Project Premortem. Harvard Business Review, September 2007. The article summary: in a premortem, team members assume the project they are planning has just failed and generate plausible reasons for the failure; making it safe for knowledgeable dissenters to speak up during planning.
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