The Fork

The record

1. 2019

   WeWork

   Reversed

   Whether to file the S-1 and take WeWork public at its $47 billion private mark

   • File S-1, go public — Restate the private story in GAAP for public buyerschose this
   • Stay private — Remain reliant on private-market opacity and a bigger next round

   Stated reasonThe filing was meant to be a formality completing WeWork's path to a public listing at its $47 billion mark

   What happened

   • 2023-11 solvency: WeWork filed for Chapter 11 with $18.65 billion in liabilities
   • 2019-09-30 IPO status: WeWork submitted the formal S-1 withdrawal request to the SEC
   • 2019-09-24 leadership: Neumann resigned as CEO
   Read the full analysis →
2. 2021

   General Electric

   Held

   Whether to break GE into three focused public companies

   • Split into three companies — Form standalone aviation, healthcare, and energy public companieschose this
   • Remain a conglomerate — Keep the combined single-entity conglomerate model

   Stated reasonFocus would give three companies greater nimbleness and end the conglomerate identity

   What happened

   • 2023-01-03 spin-off completion: GE HealthCare spun off and began trading on Nasdaq as 'GEHC'
   • 2024-04-02 spin-off completion: GE Vernova completed its spin-off and began trading on the NYSE as 'GEV'; GE Aerospace continued
   • 2024-04 stock price: GE's stock was near a seven-year high and GE HealthCare was up about 50% from its 2023 debut
   Read the full analysis →
3. 1962

   IBM

   Held

   Whether to replace incompatible product lines with a single compatible family of computers

   • Unify into one family — Build a single compatible family of computers across all sizeschose this
   • Keep incompatible lines — Continue the existing tangle of competing, incompatible product lines

   Stated reasonIBM needed one compatible family so customers could grow without throwing away programs and training

   Committedroughly $5 billion over four years (against revenue of about $2.5 billion a year)

   What happened

   • 1964 models that shipped: Models 60, 62, and 70 never shipped, replaced by the 65 and 75
   • 1971 gross income: rose 2.3 times, from $3.6 billion to $8.3 billion
   • 1982 share of gross income from System/360 descendants: more than half of the company's gross income
   Read the full analysis →
4. 1969

   Kodak

   Reversed

   Enter instant photography by inventing around Polaroid's patents rather than licensing them

   • Invent around the patents — Build an instant product without relying on Polaroid's existing patentschose this
   • License Polaroid's patents — Enter by licensing rather than engineering around the patent wall

   Stated reasonIt believed a decade of clean-room invention could outrun Polaroid's patent thicket without a license

   What happened

   • 1986-01-09 product line status: A permanent injunction barred Kodak from making or selling instant film or cameras, effective January 9, 1986
   • 1986 instant business revenue: Kodak had sold roughly $1.4 billion in instant cameras and film since 1976 to an estimated 16 million customers
   • 1990-10-12 damages ordered: A federal judge ordered Kodak to pay Polaroid $909.5 million for patent infringement
   Read the full analysis →
5. 1976

   Polaroid

   Held

   Whether to answer Kodak's instant-film entry by suing on patents rather than competing on product

   • Sue Kodak on patents — Prove in court that Kodak had no legal right to make instant filmchose this
   • Out-compete Kodak's product — Answer the intruder with a better competing camera and film

   Stated reasonNot to out-innovate the intruder but to prove in court there was no legal way for anyone else to be in the room

   What happened

   • 1985-10 Patent ruling and Kodak expulsion: A Boston judge ruled Kodak infringed seven Polaroid patents and Kodak had to withdraw from instant photography entirely
   • 1990-10 Damages award: A federal judge ordered Kodak to pay $909.5 million, the largest patent-infringement award in U.S. history at the time
   • 1991-07 Final settlement paid: Kodak paid Polaroid $925 million to settle and end the 15-year battle
   Read the full analysis →
6. 1989

   Kodak

   Held

   Whether to cannibalize the film business with digital or defend it as long as possible

   • Cannibalize film with digital — Push digital and let the film consumables annuity die
   • Defend the film annuity — Decline to sell digital products to protect film saleschose this

   Stated reasonSelling digital would break the recurring high-margin film-and-processing profit, so Kodak declined to sell it to protect film sales

   What happened

   • 1996 revenue: Kodak's annual revenue peaked at $16 billion in 1996
   • 2011 patent-licensing revenue: Patent-licensing revenue collapsed from ~$450M/year to $98 million
   • 2012-01-19 bankruptcy: Eastman Kodak filed Chapter 11 listing $5.1 billion in assets against $6.75 billion in liabilities
   Read the full analysis →
7. 2011

   Nokia

   Held

   Whether to abandon Symbian and MeeGo for a single Windows Phone ecosystem, and announce it publicly before a replacement shipped

   • Adopt Windows Phone only — Phase out Symbian and MeeGo for one Microsoft ecosystemchose this
   • Keep MeeGo hedge — Keep MeeGo alive as a high-end Linux play
   • License Android as insurance — Rent Google's ecosystem instead of or alongside

   Stated reasonA phone is an ecosystem of apps and services Nokia could not build from scratch against Apple and Google, so renting Microsoft's seemed rational

   What happened

   • 2014 smartphone market share: fell from 33% to 3%
   • 2014 stock and cumulative loss: stock dropped 62% and Nokia suffered a cumulative €4.9 billion loss
   • 2013-09-02 sale of Devices & Services: Microsoft agreed to acquire the business and license patents for EUR 5.44 billion
   Read the full analysis →
8. 2016

   AbbVie

   Held

   Whether to acquire Stemcentrx and its late-stage cancer drug Rova-T

   • Buy Stemcentrx with earn-out — Pay $5.8B upfront plus up to $4B contingent milestoneschose this
   • Pay full price upfront — Pay the entire consideration up front with no contingency

   Stated reasonPay an additional $4 billion beyond the upfront price only on successful achievement of milestones

   Committedapproximately $5.8 billion (upfront cash and stock paid at close; up to $4 billion in milestones was contingent and never paid)

   What happened

   • 2018 IPR&D impairment: pre-tax impairment charge of $5.1 billion ($4.5 billion after-tax) as IPR&D fell to $1.0 billion from $6.1 billion
   • 2018 milestone benefit: after-tax benefit of $375 million booked from the change in fair value of the milestone liability
   • 2019 program termination and further impairment: terminated the Rova-T program and recorded an additional $1.0 billion impairment of remaining IPR&D
   Read the full analysis →
9. 2019

   WeWork

   Held

   Should WeWork take its $47 billion private valuation to a public IPO, or postpone the offering?

   • Proceed with public IPO — Test the $47B private mark against public investors via the S-1 filing.
   • Withdraw the IPO — Pull the S-1 and postpone the offering to a later date.chose this

   Stated reasonPublic investors valued the company as low as $10 billion against the $47 billion private mark, so the company postponed the offering.

   What happened

   • 2019-09-30 public valuation: public investors sought to value the company as low as $10 billion against the $47 billion private mark
   • 2019-09-24 CEO tenure: Adam Neumann resigned as CEO
   • 2019-09-04 trademark arrangement: the 'We' trademark arrangement was unwound 'at Adam's direction,' with partnership interests returned
   Read the full analysis →
10. 2000

    WPP

    Held

    Whether to buy Young & Rubicam as a fixed-price takeover rather than a performance-based earn-out

    • Fixed-price stock takeover — Pay the full price up front, with the premium becoming goodwillchose this
    • Performance-based earn-out — Hold back price, pay only if sellers hit targets

    Stated reasonThe deal made WPP the largest advertising group in the world

    Committedaround $5.5 billion (all-stock swap for Young & Rubicam)

    What happened

    • 2020 goodwill impairment: £2.8 billion goodwill impairment, majority relating to the 2000 Young & Rubicam acquisition
    • 2023 brand retirement: WPP folded Young & Rubicam (with JWT and Wunderman) into a single agency called VML
    Read the full analysis →
11. 2001

    Boeing

    Held

    Whether to move headquarters away from the engineers who build planes

    • Move HQ to Chicago — Relocate leadership 1,700 miles from the factory floorschose this
    • Keep HQ near engineers — Leave leadership in the Seattle area beside operations

    Stated reasonA separate corporate headquarters would let leadership judge each unit dispassionately, at a distance from the commercial-airplane operations

    What happened

    • 2011 737 program strategy: Boeing chose to re-engine the aging 737 rather than design a clean-sheet replacement, leading to the MCAS compromises
    • 2022 headquarters location: Boeing relocated its headquarters again from Chicago to Arlington, Virginia, further from the factory
    Read the full analysis →
12. 2003

    Palm

    Held

    Whether Palm should acquire the failing Handspring to obtain the Treo product line

    • Acquire Handspring — Buy Handspring via merger to obtain the Treo linechose this
    • Build Treo in-house — Continue Palm's own roadmap without the acquisition

    Stated reasonTo obtain the highly regarded Treo product line and carrier relationships that Palm's own roadmap had not delivered

    What happened

    • 2003-10-29 corporate structure: PalmSource was spun off the same day and the hardware company was renamed palmOne
    • 2005-07 brand name: palmOne reclaimed the 'Palm, Inc.' name only after buying PalmSource's share of the trademark for $30 million
    Read the full analysis →