Company profile
SEC EDGAR ↗- Industry
- Computer & office Equipment
- Listed
- NYSE: HPQ
- Incorporated
- DE
- Headquarters
- Palo Alto, CA
- Fiscal year end
- Oct 31
Financials
FY2025- Revenue
- $55.3B
- Net income
- $2.53B
- Total assets
- $41.8B
| Fiscal year | Revenue | Net income | Total assets |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY2025 | $55.3B | $2.53B | $41.8B |
| FY2024 | $53.6B | $2.77B | $39.9B |
| FY2023 | $53.7B | $3.26B | $37.0B |
| FY2022 | $62.9B | $3.13B | $38.5B |
| FY2021 | $63.5B | $6.54B | $38.6B |
| FY2020 | $56.6B | $2.81B | $34.7B |
Reported fiscal years from SEC filings (10-K) — SEC EDGAR ↗. Stratrix is a strategy publication, not a real-time financial data service.
In depth
Decisions on record
5 verified Decision Records on HP, and the casebook each one belongs to.
| Fork date | Decision type | The story | Casebook |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2001 | Adjacency Expansion | Read the story → | Adjacency Expansion Casebook → |
| 2011 | Succession Question | Read the story → | Succession Question Casebook → |
| 2014 | The Fork | Read the story → | The Fork Casebook → |
| 2015 | Succession Question | Read the story → | Succession Question Casebook → |
| 2015 | Adjacency Expansion | Read the story → | Adjacency Expansion Casebook → |
Run one of these yourself
The decisions HP faced, as kits you can run.
Each pack takes one of these decisions and gives you the framework, a deck for the room, a model that resolves to one number, and the sourced cases behind it. $499, one-time.
Business ModelThe Loss LeaderWhat share of the units you sell cheap has to come back for the subsidy to be repaid?See the pack →Growth & PortfolioThe Adjacency ExpansionWhen does the business next door belong to you?See the pack →Decision ForksThe Road Not TakenWhat did the decision you did not take actually cost?See the pack →
The analyses
The Loss Leader · Business Model
The Printer Is the Bait: How HP Sells Hardware at a Loss to Win the Ink War
HP's CEO said the quiet part out loud: the company loses money on the printer and makes it back on the ink. That single sentence explains the cheap hardware, the firmware that bricks third-party cartridges, and the lawsuits - the whole architecture of a loss leader defended to the death.
7 min
The Adjacency Expansion · Growth & Portfolio
HP's Best Expansions Followed Its Customers — the $25B Compaq Bet Chased Scale and Destroyed Value
HP built its first computer in 1966 just to run its own instruments. Its first desktop PC flopped. The lesson: HP's adjacency moves won when they followed the installed base - and its $25B Compaq bet, chasing scale instead, won a shareholder vote by 45 million shares and destroyed value doing it.
8 min
The Adjacency Expansion · Growth & Portfolio
HP Spent 76 Years Chasing the Next Business. The Split Was an Admission It Caught Too Many.
HP started with a $538 audio oscillator and ended up two companies. From test gear to PCs, PCs to services via Compaq, services to software via Autonomy — each leap destroyed value, and 2015 wasn't a masterstroke. It was a confession.
8 min
The Fork · Decision Forks
HP's 2015 split promised two equal twins — only one kept coming apart
In 2015 HP became two companies, and the tidy story says each one then splintered further. It didn't. Only the enterprise twin kept separating — spinning off two businesses in 2017 and exiting China by 2023 — while HP Inc., legally the original firm renamed, never split again.
8 min
The Succession Question · People & Control
HP Kept Hiring CEOs to Fix It. The Thing They Were Fixing Was Its Soul.
After its founders, HP burned through five CEOs in sixteen years - two forced out, one in eleven months - chasing a single transformational thesis. The 2015 split wasn't a triumph. It was the board admitting no one person could carry both halves of the legacy.
8 min
The Succession Question · People & Control
Three Fired CEOs, $83M in Severance, an $8.8B Write-Down: HP's Board Kept Making the Same Hire
Three CEOs forced out in under a decade, a fourth departure that the filing called voluntary, more than $83M in severance, an $8.8B write-down. The revolving door wasn't a run of bad leaders. It was the same dysfunctional board making the same hire, then firing it, then doing it again.
8 min